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Abstract
We evaluate the management of the Northern Stock of Hake during 1986-2001. A stochastic
bioeconomic model is calibrated to match the main features of this ﬁshing ground. We show how
catches, biomass stock and proﬁts would have been if the optimal Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)
consistent with the target biomass implied by the Fischler’s Recovery Plan had been implemented.
The main ﬁnding are: i) an optimal CFP would have generated proﬁts of more than 667 millions
euros, ii) if side-payments are allowed (implemented by ITQ’s, for example) these proﬁts increase
26%.
JEL Classiﬁcation: Q22, Q28.
Key words: Common Fisheries Policy, Fishing Regulation, Fischler Recovery Plan.
Short running title: The Optimality of the CFP.
† We thank two anonymous referees whose comments and suggestions have substantially improved the paper, and
to Javier Pereiro from Instituto Oceanográﬁco de Vigo for making available part of data available to us. Finan-
cial support from the I n s t i t u t od eE s t u d i o sE c o n ó m i c o sd eG a l i c i a ,P e d r oB a r r i ed el aM a z a ,FEDER, Ministerio
de Ciencia y Tecnología, SEC2002-4318-C02-01 (José María Da-Rocha), CICYT 1393-12254/2000 and SEC2003-
02510/ECO (María José Gutiérrez), Fundación BBVA 1/BBVA 00044.321-15466/2002 (María José Gutiérrez) and
from Universidad del País Vasco, 9/UPV00035.321-13511/2001 (María José Gutiérrez) is gratefully acknowledged.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The total allowable catch (TAC) is the key element in the management of ﬁshing exploitation
rates considered by the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). At the end of each year, on the basis of
scientiﬁc advice given mainly by the ICES (International Council for the Exploration of the Sea),
the Council of Ministers sets the TACs for certain important species of ﬁshes. Each TAC is divided
up among the member states in the form of quotas according to the Relative Stability Principle
(RSP). Most of the quotas were set for the ﬁrst time in 1983. In establishing them the Council took
into account the traditional ﬁshing activities of each country and the speciﬁc needs of the regions
particularly dependent on the ﬁshery sector (“Hague Preferences”). The distribution settled in
1983 was modiﬁed in 1986 after the accession of Spain and Portugal to the European Community.
In general terms, the CFP failed to manage eﬃciently the ﬁshing grounds. The Commission
recognizes “[...] the alarming state of many ﬁsh stocks that are outside safe biological limits. Stock
sizes and landings have declined dramatically over the last 25 years. For many commercially impor-
tant demersal stocks, the numbers of mature ﬁsh were about twice as high in the early 1970‘s than
in the late 1990‘s. It current trends continue many Community ﬁsh stocks will collapse”.1 Given
this situation, a new regulation of the CFP come into force on January 1st, 2003.2
The objective of this paper is to quantify the losses associated with the exploitation of the
CFP in regard to the Northern Stock of Hake from 1986 to 2001. This is a common ﬁshing ground
regulated by the CFP which is formed mainly by ICES zones VII and VIII3 and is exploited by the
Spanish and French ﬂeets. Biomass in this ﬁshing ground dropped from about 290,000 Tn. in the
early 1980s to 170,000 Tn. in 2001. This reduction was reﬂected in captures, which dropped from
60,000 Tn. to 37,000 Tn. in the same period. In October 2001, the ICES Advisory Committee
for Fisheries Management considered that the stock was outside safe biological limits. In the light
of ICES recommendations, Commissioner Fischler presented an Emergency Plan to recover the
Northern Stock of Hake.4
European hake (merluccius merluccius) has also been studied from the economic point of view
by other authors. For instance, Garza-Gil (1998) illustrates how individual transferable quotas may
help to achieve eﬃcient exploitation in a multiﬂeet setting using data from the Southern Stock of
Hake.5 However our paper addresses the problem of eﬃcient exploitation in a diﬀerent manner
1Roadmap 2002, page 3.
2Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002.
3The Northern Stock of Hake is formed by ICES areas IIa, IIIa,b,c,d, IV, Vb, VI, VII and VIIIa,b,d,e. However
captures from areas VII and VIII represent more than 90% of total captures of the whole stock.
4The proposal for the Recovery Plan was presented in June 2001 (COM(2001) 326 ﬁnal), and in December 2002
was amended (COM(2002) 773 ﬁnal).
5The Southern Stock of Hake is formed by areas VIIIc and IXa which correspond to the east Portuguese waters
and the south of the Bay of Biscay. ICES divides the Atlantic stock of hake in the Northern and the Southern stock
for managerial purpouses. However authors as Roldan et al. (1998) point out that the population genetic structure
2than in Garza- Gil (1998). While she considers exploitation in the steady state, we analyze the
transition from the initial situation to the steady state in the presence of productivity shocks.
We build an stochastic model for a heterogeneous multi ﬂeet ﬁshery regulated by a common
policymaker in order to show how to deﬁne an Optimal Common Fisheries Policy (OCFP). This
stochastic bioeconomic model is calibrated in order to reproduce the main characteristics of the
observed exploitation of the Northern Stock of Hake from 1986 to 2001: the relative catches per
unit of eﬀort (c.p.u.e.) of the French and Spanish ﬂeets; the observed catches and biomass stock
of the Northern Stock of Hake during the period 1978-2000 and the quotas associated with the
RSP obtained from the national TAC’s established by the CFP during 1986-2001. Moreover the
calibration is consistent with the target stock implied by the Fischler recovery plan approved in
the Council Meetings held in December 2001 and June 2002 with the aim of recovering the stock
of Hake.
The calibrated model is used to show how catches, biomass stock and proﬁts would have
been if the OCFP had been implemented and what would have happened if side-payments had
been allowed. The main ﬁnding is that an OCFP would have generated more than 111,698 Tn. of
proﬁts and a policy that allowed for side-payments (implemented by individual transferable quotas
(ITQ), for example) would have increased these proﬁts by 26%.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we build the model and an OCFP is
deﬁned. The model is adapted to characterize the Northern Stock of Hake in Section 3. Subsection
3.1 presents the deterministic steady state version of the model which is useful for the calibration
part of the paper. In Subsection 3.2 the calibration of the ﬁshery is illustrated. Section 4 reports
the quantitative experiments: ﬁrst, how eﬃcient the CFP was during the period studied; second,
what would have happened if side-payments between ﬂeets had been allowed. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
In order to show how we deﬁne an OCFP we build a model for a heterogeneous multi ﬂeet ﬁshery
regulated by a common policymaker. Assume that the dynamics of the aggregate level of catches
in period t, Yt(Lt,X t), depend upon the total eﬀective eﬀort, Lt, and the level of ﬁsh stock in
this period, Xt. To introduce heterogeneity we make two assumptions. First, we assume that the
eﬀective eﬀort of each ﬂeet is a function of its productivity, in particular we deﬁne the eﬀective
eﬀort of country i as l
θi
i where θi represents the productivity parameter of ﬂeet i. Therefore, the







of the hake is more complex than the discrete Northern and Southern stock proposed by ICES.
3where n is the number of ﬂeets ﬁshing in the area. Second, each country i obtains a share of the









, ∀i =1 ,...,n.
These two assumptions allow us to express the production function of each country as a function









Yt(Lt,X t), ∀i =1 ,...,n.
Notice that this expression implies two diﬀerent externality eﬀects of the eﬀort of one of the ﬂeets
over the captures of the other ﬂeets. On the one hand a raise of the current eﬀort of any ﬂeet
produces an increase in total current captures and this reduces future stock and therefore future
individual captures. So this intertemporal eﬀect is negative provided ∂Yt/∂Xt > 0. On the other
hand an increase in the eﬀort of ﬂeet j reduces the quota of any ﬂeet i 6= j but at the same time
increase total captures. This is an intratemporal eﬀect which is ambiguous whenever ∂Yt/∂Lt > 0.6
Finally the dynamic of the biomass is given by
Xt+1 = F(Xt) − Yt,
where F(Xt) is the gross growth of the biomass which is called the stock-recruitment relation and,
following the terminology of ﬁshery biologists, Xt+1 can be called the escapement7. We assume
that F(Xt) is a continuously, twice diﬀerentiable and strictly concave function.
Let us suppose that the common ﬁshery is managed by a benevolent regulator who maximizes




βt(γ1Π1,t + γ2Π2,t + ... + γnΠn,t),
where Et represents the expectation taken at time t and β is the discount factor. Πi,t represents
the proﬁto fﬂeet i in period t,d e ﬁned as the diﬀerence between its catches, yi,t, and the real eﬀort
cost (measured in units of ﬁsh), ωili,t. γi is the exogenous weight of country i in the regulator´s
objective function. These weights can be interpreted as the political power of country i within the
regulatory agency. A similar interpretation for the case of international environmental agreements
can be found in Escapa and Gutiérrez (1997).8
6This assumption implies that, at any time, captures by one ﬂeet depend on the eﬀort of the other ﬂeets. We
consider that this is an acceptable approach in an aggregate analysis of the ﬂeets but it may be diﬃcult to approve
in a micro-level study. In any case, we are aware that this model includes an extra externality that may overestimate
the welfare gains from cooperation.
7See Clark (1990, Ch. 7) for a study of the discrete-time and metered models of ﬁsheries.
8The need to introduce of political elements into ﬁshery regulation was acknowledged by Emma Bonino, ex-
Commissioner for Fisheries (see point 4 in the Memorandum on Questions raised by the preparation of the MAGP
IV, 1997).







that solves the following problem:
[OCFP] ≡
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t=0 βt(γ1Π1,t + γ2Π2,t + ... + γnΠn,t),
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,a n ds t o c kt a r g e tXt+1, such that, for
each period t:





















, ∀i =1 ,...,n.
This means that diﬀerent sets of weights in the regulator’s objective function imply diﬀerent quotas
for the ﬂeets. In other words, the system of quotas associated with the RSP can be understood as
an eﬃcient policy under a particular set of weights.9
3 The Northern Stock of Hake
Hake has been the main species supporting trawling ﬂeets oﬀ the Atlantic coasts of France and
Spain since the 1930s, and it is present in the catches of nearly all ﬁsheries in sub-areas ICES VII
and VIII. In 2000, Spain took 61% of the catches, France 22%, the UK about 6% and Ireland 4%.10
Hake is caught throughout the year, though the peak landings are made in the spring-summer
months. The three main gear types used by vessels ﬁshing for hake as a target species are lines
(Spain), ﬁxed-nets and other trawls (all countries). Hake spawn from March to July at depths of
9See Da Rocha and Gutiérrez (2003) for an analysis of this issue in a deterministic context.
10Data from Table 5.1.1. in Report ICES CM 2002/ACFM:05.
5120-160 m., mainly to the south and west of Ireland. They move to shallower water by September.
T h et w om a j o rn u r s e r ya r e a sa r et h eB a yo fB i s c a ya n do ﬀ southern Ireland. As they become
mature, they disperse to oﬀshore regions of the Bay of Biscay and Celtic Sea. Male hake mature
at 3-4 years old (27-35 cm) and females at 5-7 years old (50-70 cm).
Like all the main stocks of the EU, the Northern Stock of Hake is managed by TAC and
quotas with associated technical measures. During the period analyzed the Commission allocated
an average of 55% of the TAC to France, 30% to Spain, 11% to the UK and 3% to Ireland (see Da
Rocha and Gutiérrez (2003)). The minimum legal sizes for ﬁsh caught in this area is 27cm total
length.
Biomass dropped from about 290,000 Tn. in the early 1980s to 170,000 Tn. in 2001 (see
Table 6 in Appendix A.2). This reduction was reﬂected in captures, which dropped from 60,000
Tn. to 37,000 Tn. in the same period. In October 2000, the ICES Advisory Committee for
Fisheries Management considered that the stock was outside safe biological limits. In the light of
ICES recommendations, an Emergency Plan was implemented by the Commission in June 2001 to
recover the Northern Stock of Hake. The objective is to reduce catches of small hake in ﬁsheries
taking place in hake nursery areas. Nevertheless, these emergency measures do not apply to vessels
less than 12 m in length which return to port within 24 hours of their most recent departure
(Council Regulations 1162/2001, 2602/2001 and 494/2002). For more detailed information see the
last report drawn up by the Working Group on the Assessment of Southern Stocks of Hake, Monk
and Megrim (WGHMM) (Report ICES CM 2003/ACMF:01).
3.1 Characterization of the Steady State
To analyze the optimality of the CFP in the Northern Stock of Hake, we use a dynamic stochastic
version of Spence’s model (1974) for the case of a heterogeneous multi ﬂeet ﬁshery.11 The total
catches function is given by
Yt =[ 1− e−λLt]F(Xt), (1)
where λ is a capturability parameter.
The stock-recruitment relation is a Cushing function, i.e.
F(Xt)=AtXα
t , (2)
where parameter α represents the elasticity of the gross stock growth and At is a random variable
that can be interpreted as the productivity of the resource at time t, which can change as a function
11Spence (1974) developed a deterministic model in order to analyze Antarctic whale harvesting. It has also been
used by other authors such as Gallastegui (1983) for the sardine ﬁshery of the Gulf of Valencia (Spain) and Amundsen
et al. (1995) for the Northeast Atlantic Minke Whale.
6of the state of nature.12 We assume that At = eztA,w h e r eA is a constant and zt is a random
variable with mean zero which follows a Markov process, with a transition matrix, π.
Considering the capturability function, (1), and the gross growth of the biomass, (2), the
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i . We can interpret the solution in the following way: equations (3)a n d( 4)
determine the level of stock and total eﬀort that are compatible, and equation (5) indicates how
eﬀort should be shared out among the national ﬂeets.
We can express the steady state as a function of the observed data, the quotas ˆ si,t h eT A C ,















AXα − X = Y, (7)
[ωL(X)1/θis
(1−θi)/θi
i /θi] − Y
[ωL(X)1/θks
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i=1 si =1 . These equations are useful for our calibration
strategy in the next section.
3.2 Calibration
We calibrate the model assuming that three ﬂeets operate in the Northern Stock of Hake: Spain,
France and the Rest of the Union. We denote their variables with the subscripts sp, fr and ru,
12Other authors have introduced uncertainty into the dynamics of the resource. For instance, Danielsson (2002)
and Weitzman (2002) analyze the relative performance of diﬀerent methods of ﬁsheries management when there are
some risks involved. Androkovich and Stolley (1989) simulated a stochastic dynamic program where the growth
equation for the ﬁsh stock is aproximated by a linear function which can be hit by additive random disturbances.
7respectively. In this context, the model has thirteen parameters, α, A, z, π, θsp, θfr, θru, λ, γsp,
γfr, γru, ω and β. The model is calibrated to reproduce: (1) relative catches per unit of eﬀort
(c.p.u.e) of the French and Spanish ﬂeets in areas VII and VIII; (2) catches and biomass stock
of the Northern Stock of Hake during the period 1978-2001; (3) quotas obtained from the average
TAC’s during the period 1986-2002; and (4) the target stock announced by Fischler’s recovery plan.
The parameters from the biological resource equation, α, A, z and π can be calibrated with
available data on stock and total captures. Calibration of biological resource equation parameters is
based on available data for stock and total captures from the period 1978-2001 in the Northern Stock
of Hake. These data were compiled by the Working Group on the Assessment of Southern Stocks
of Hake, Monk and Megrim (WGHMM) from the ICES and are shown in Table 6 in Appendix A.2.
The ﬁrst step in calibration consists of estimating A and α from the biological equation expressed
in logarithms,
log(Xt+1 + Yt)=l o gA + αlogXt + zt.
The results of estimation by OLS imply ˆ A =1 2 .8519 and ˆ α =0 .8095. Both estimates are sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (t statistics are 2.737856 and 10.683081 for A and α, respectively)
and R2 =0 .845. Other alternative functional forms for the dynamic resource equation, apart from
Cushing, have been considered. Table 9 in Appendix A.3 shows the estimation results for the
logistic, logistic with minimum viable size, Ricker and Gompertz functions.
From the estimated errors,







we estimate an AR(1) process ˆ zt+1 = ρˆ zt + εˆ z, obtaining an estimated autoregressive coeﬃcient
ˆ ρ = −0.11741. Once those parameters have been estimated, the stochastic process is calibrated
in such a way that the sequence of productivity shocks reproduces the stock and total catches
observed from 1978 to 2001. In order to do this, we have taken ﬁve equidistant values for the state
of the productivity shock, that is z ∈ {−0.1510,−0.0755,0,0.0755,0.1510}.F i g u r e s1 and 2 show
the observed and calibrated productivity shocks and stocks, respectively, from 1978 on.
[Figure 1 about here]
[Figure 2 about here]
Given ˆ ρ and the values for the states of z, we calculate the transition matrix, π,f o rt h e




    


0.0006 0.1991 0.5221 0.3164 0.0318
0.0035 0.1682 0.5428 0.2633 0.0222
0.0080 0.2133 0.5499 0.2133 0.0155
0.0146 0.2633 0.5428 0.1682 0.0111
0.0242 0.3164 0.5221 0.1291 0.0082





where πj,i = Pr[zt+1 = zj|zt = zi].
To calibrate the productivity parameters, θsp and θfr, and the capturability parameter, λ,w e
use a two-step procedure. First, we calibrate a parameter φ that reﬂects productivity diﬀerences
between the Spanish and French trawler ﬂeets using data from homogenous ﬂeets. Second, θfr and
λ are calibrated to target the French data on eﬀort and catches. We follow this two-step procedure
because we do not have eﬀort data for the whole Spanish ﬂeet.
To calibrate φ reﬂecting the diﬀerences on productivities when homogeneous ﬂeets are consid-
ered we assume that eﬀort is independent of the productivity parameters. Under this assumption









In order to evaluate φ, we use data on c.p.u.e. by ﬂeets provided by the WGHMM of the ICES and
captures by ﬂeets from Instituto Oceanográﬁco de Vigo. In particular, the Spanish c.p.u.e. data
correspond to the Coruña trawler ﬂeet which operates in deeper waters close to the slope in division
VIIb,c,j,k. The French c.p.u.e. data come from the FR-RESSGASCS survey conducted in the Bay
of Biscay following French trawlers ﬁshing in subarea VIIIa,b (see Table 7 in Appendix A.2). Eﬀort
data can be calculated as captures/c.p.u.e. Shares for the trawler ﬂeets have been calculated as the
ratio of captures of each ﬂeet in the area in which the reference trawler ﬂeet ﬁshes to total captures
of the Northern Stock. However, since data on captures by ﬂeets are available only for the years
1988-1990, we can only calculate eﬀort and share data by ﬂeets for those years. The data drawn up
are summarized in Table 1.13 φ is calculated from equation (9) taking the average values in Table
1.
[Table 1 about here]
The capturability parameter, λ, and the productivity parameter for the French ﬂeet, θfr, are
jointly calibrated to reproduce the eﬀort and capture data of the French ﬂeet in subareas VII and
13We thank Javier Pereiro fom Instituto Oceanográﬁco de Vigo for making data available to us.
9VIII of the Northern Stock. To do this we use the capturability equation (1) expressing the total
eﬀort in terms of the French share and eﬀort, that is




We have data for the whole French ﬂeet as regard eﬀort and captures in subareas VII and VIII for
1988-1990 (see Table 8 in Appendix A.2).14 Using these data, we have calculated λ and θfr such
that the squared error associated with the above equation is minimized for 1988-1990. The results
are λ =0 .0061838352 and θfr =0 .49. We assume that Spanish productivity is proportional to the
diﬀerences observed in the trawler ﬂeet, i.e. θsp = θfr/φ. This implies θsp =0 .53. We also assume
that the rest of the ﬂeets that ﬁsh in the Northern Stock have the same productivity as the French
ﬂeet, that is θru = θfr.
Finally, the weights in the regulator’s objective function, γ0
is,a n dt h er e a le ﬀort cost, ω,a r e
calibrated jointly to reproduce the legal TACs and the target stock proposed in the Fischler recovery
plan. This plan was approved in the Council Meetings held in December 2001 and June 2002 with
the aim of recovering the stock of hake (see, Documents 15383/1 and 9557/02). In particular, the
objective is to introduce a multiannual recovery plan for hake with a recovery period of seven to
eight years and yearly increases in the biomass of 15%. Since the stock of hake in 2001 is 171,000
Tn. approximately, this multiannual plan will recover the stock up to around 450,000 Tn. We
assume that a steady state situation will be reached when the stock has been recovered, i.e. when
the stock reaches approximately 450,000 Tn.
As quotas for each ﬂeet, we use the average of the legal quotas i m p o s e db yt h eC F Pi na r e a s
VII and VIII during the period 1987-2002 adjusted to consider the whole Northern Stock of Hake.
We know that the quotas imposed by the CFP in areas VII and VIII for this period are on average
ssp =5 4 .76%,s fr =3 0 .06%, and sru =1 5 .18% (see Da Rocha and Gutiérrez (2003)). However
areas VII and VIII only represent 93.72% of the captures in the Northern Stock of Hake. We also
know that in 2000 captures outside areas VII and VIII were 9.52% for the Spanish ﬂeet, 30.78% for
the French ﬂeet and 59.70% for the rest of the ﬂeets (see Report ICES CM 2002, page 471). We
have adjusted the data to obtain the quotas for the whole stock, i.e. ssp =5 1 .92%,s fr =3 0 .10%,
and sru =1 7 .97%.
With these data, the calibration of the other parameters, and the assumption that β is 0.95,
we use (6), (7) and (8) to ﬁnd the values of γsp,γfr,γru and ω that satisfy γsp + γfr + γru =1 .
The calibration results are summarized in Table 2. Observe that the maximum sustainable
yield (MSY) in our biological model is given by MSY = 1−α
α (αA)
1/(1−α) , which can be sustained
14Unfortunately, we do not have these data for the whole Spanish ﬂeet, so we cannot jointly calibrate the parameters
in the biological resource equation and capturability equation.
10with a biomass of XMSY =( αA)
1/(1−α) . 15 Given the calibration of parameters α and A,t h i s
implies MSY = 51,444 Tn. The required biomass to maintain the MSY is XMSY = 218,610 Tn.
[Table 2 about here]
4 Quantitative Experiments
In this section we explore how eﬃcient the CFP was in the Northern Stock of Hake from 1986
to 2001. In particular, we ask: i) How would catches, biomass stock and proﬁts have been if the
O C F Ph a db e e ni m p l e m e n t e d ? i i )W h a tw o u l dh a v eh a p p e n e di ft h eo p t i m a lp o l i c yw i t hs i d e -
payments had been implemented? The main ﬁndings in this section are: i) an OCFP would have
generated more than 111,000 Tn. of proﬁts, which means more than 670 millions euros, considering
6 euros/kilo as the price of hake and ii) a policy that allowed for side-payments (implemented by
ITQ’s, for example) would have increased these proﬁts by 26%.
4.1 The eﬃciency of the CFP
In this section, we investigate whether the observed exploitation paths for 1986-2001 in the Northern
Stock of Hake can be considered eﬃcient given the quotas associated with the RSP, {ˆ si}
n
i=1,a n d
the initial conditions of the stock, X0 = X1986. To simulate the model we iterate the value function
associated with the OCFP problem. Given a system of quotas ˆ s, the dynamic program can be
expressed as a function of the stock, X, and the state of nature z. Formally, the value function is
given by













Y = AezXα − X0 ≥ 0,
z ∈ [z1,z 2,z 3,z 4,z 5],π,
where the proﬁts of each ﬂeet are given by











15The XMSY is the stock size such that the net growth of biomass is maximum. In other words, the value of X for
which ∂ (F (Xt) − Xt)/∂Xt =0 .T h eMSY is the value of the net growth when X = XMSY. Recently, the National
Marine Fisheries Service of the USA has started to call this "long-term potential yield".
11We calculate the OCFP using the calibrated parameters and simulate the optimal stock and
catches paths associated with the stochastic shocks calibrated for the period 1986-2001. The results
are illustrated in Figures 3 (a) and (b), respectively.
[Figure 3 about here]
We can see in Figure 3(a) that optimal exploitation led to a recovery of the stock until 1997,
when it dropped again. Comparing this optimal path with the data we can conclude that the CFP
has been a complete failure. In Figure 3 (b) we can observe that until 1996, captures were greater
than they should have been according to optimal exploitation. In particular, in 1986 captures
were about 60,000 Tn. when the optimal exploitation called for less than 10,000 Tn. The gap
between the optimal and the observed catches was narrowed until 1997. However from then on this
gap widened considerably. Therefore, the implementation of the CFP has been characterized by
an excess of captures and eﬀort that has depleted stocks and reduced proﬁts. Table 3 shows the
deviations of the observed exploitation paths from the optimal ones in aggregate terms. Captures
are about 617,000 Tn. more than optimal. This means that eﬀective exploitation has deviated
by more than 260% from the eﬃcient policy. This overexploitation has depleted stocks. In 2001
biomass was about 170,000 Tn. while optimal exploitation would require a resource stock of 462,000
Tn.
[Table 3 about here]
This overexploitation of the stock has dissipated proﬁts. If the ﬂeets had ﬁshed eﬃciently the
present value of the future proﬁts would have been 111,698 Tn. of resources, which means more
than 670 million euros, considering 6 euros/kilo as the price of hake. Moreover, when the proﬁts
associated with the observed data for the whole period are calculated, considering the eﬀort cost
calibrated to match the target stock of the Commission, we observe that they are negative. This
result is typical in open access ﬁsheries. Therefore, we can assume that ﬂeets are operating in fact
in a situation of open access and proﬁts are zero. This means that the ineﬃcient exploitation of
the Northern Stock of Hake has resulted in a monetary loss of more than 670 million euros.
4.2 Optimal Side-Payments
In this section we compare the OCFP associated with the quotas imposed by the Community
according to the RSP with optimal exploitation in the case in which side-payments among ﬂeets
are allowed. Formally this solution is called the ﬁrst optimum. It corresponds to the OCFP for the
case in which the regulator does not discriminate between the ﬂeets, that is when γi =1 /n.
12From the technical point of view, this solution could be implemented by the European Com-
mission through a system of individual transferable quotas (ITQs). Observe that assigning a quota
f o rc a t c h i n gas p e c i ﬁed amount of ﬁsh to a ﬂeet can lead to the ﬁrst optimum provided this quota
is transferable and divisible. In this case, each holder of the quota has a private property right to
the ﬁsh and could sell or lease part or all of the quota to other ﬂeets and receive the discounted
future proﬁt from the use of the quota. This may mean that over time an arbitrary distribution of
quotas, for instance the quotas associated with RSP, should lead to the ﬁrst optimum of eﬀort and
harvest.
Table 4 shows the quotas associated with OCFP as a result of side-payments between ﬂeets.
In other words, the Commission can share out the TAC among ﬂeets a priori according to the
RSP; however, if side-payments are allowed, then the TAC is shared out a posteriori, as Table
4 indicates. We can observe that the results imply a large redistribution of captures between
countries. In particular there is a signiﬁcant reduction of France’s quota in favor of Spain and the
Rest of the Union.
[Table 4 about here]
This result can also be observed in Figure 4, where capture paths for each of the policies
considered are illustrated. Panel (a) shows that in aggregate terms the OCFP generates lower
captures than the side-payments solution for all periods. The intuition for this result is clear;
the side-payment solution is the optimal solution in which aggregate proﬁts are maximized and it
therefore allows more captures. However the redistribution of the TAC among ﬂeets is uneven. We
can observe in panels (b), (c) and (d) that the side-payments solution pushes France’s captures
below the OCFP policy level while those of Spain and Rest of the Union are above that level.
[Figure 4 about here]
Table 5 shows the results of the OCFP and side-payments policy in quantitative terms.
Several points can be observed. First, if side-pay m e n t sh a db e e na l l o w e d ,t h es t o c kw o u l dn o th a v e
recovered as much as with the OCFP. In particular, the stock would be about 422,000 Tn. in 2001.
Second, with side-payments the capture path would have been less severe than that implied by
the OCFP. Observed captures deviate by 504,000 Tn. from the side payments policy compared to
617,000 Tn. from the OCFP. And third, with side-payments the present value of total proﬁts is 26%
greater than under OCFP. Moreover, this increase in total proﬁts is shared out diﬀerently among
countries: Spain and the Rest of the Union increase their proﬁts by 46% and 73%, respectively,
while France’s proﬁts drop by 14%. Figure 5 compares the trends in stock and annual increase
13in proﬁts under the OCFP and side-payments policies (panel (a) and (b) respectively). We can
observe that the implementation of an optimal policy with side-payments generates greater proﬁts
year by year (the increase is more than 35% for some years). This rise in proﬁts is due to a more
eﬃcient exploitation of the resource, which allows lower levels of stock to be maintained.
[Table 5 about here]
[Figure 5 about here]
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we show how to deﬁne an optimal policy for a given quota.T h i sa l l o w su st od e ﬁne an
optimal Common Fishery Policy (OCFP) where the optimal quotas are those associated with the
Relative Stability Principle. We also show how to calibrate a model to reproduce the main facts of
the exploitation in the Northern Stock of Hake from 1978 to 2001. Finally we use the calibrated
model to simulate optimal catches, biomass of Hake and proﬁts of each ﬂeet. The main ﬁnding is
that an OCFP would have generated more than 111,000 Tn. of proﬁts (about 670 millions euro)
and a policy that would have allowed side-payments would have increased the proﬁts of the ﬁshing
ground by 26%.
In future research we want to compute the proﬁts from the stock recovery associated with the
Fischler recovery plan. This will allow us to learn whether the proﬁts associated with the recovery
of the stock are greater than the cost of the destruction of eﬀort associated with that proposal.
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16AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Characterization of the Steady State
The [OCFP] problem with functional forms in section 3 is:
[OCFP] ≡

          







t=0 βt(γ1Π1t + γ2Π2t + ... + γnΠnt)
s.t.




















Since we are interested in characterizing the steady state without uncertainty, we remove the condi-
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 =0 , ∀i =1 ,...,n ∀t, (10)
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∂Xt+1
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li,tsi,tsk,t ∀i 6= k,
θi
li,tsi,t (1 − si,t) ∀i = k.
17Summing up (13) and (14) over k =1 ,...,n and taking into account that restrictions in the optimization
















































































γksk − (1 − βα)µ =0 . (19)
On the other hand, substituting expressions (15) and (16) in the optimality condition (10), we can










































Substituting this expression of µ in (19), and after some calculations, equation (6) in the main text is
obtained.
To obtain equation (7) in the main text it suﬃces to equal µ for any two ﬂeets and consider that
1 − X1−α
A = Y




[Table 6 about here]
[Table 7 about here]
[Table 8 about here]
18A.3 Estimates
Table 9 shows the estimation of the dynamic resource equation using diﬀerent functional forms. The two ﬁrst
blocks illustrates the results of estimation using the Cushing and the Ricker functions as stock-recruitment
relation. The last three blocks show the estimations using the logistic, the logistic with minimum viable
population size (MVPS) and the Gompertz as net growth biomass function.16. For a detailed description of
these functions see Conrad (1999, pages 32-35) and Hanley et al. (1997, pages 276-280)
[Table 9 about here]
We can observe that the logistic with minimum viable population size (MVPS) function does not
ﬁt the data at all. Logistic, Gompertz and Ricker functions ﬁt the data fairly well, however the Cushing
function has been chosen because the parameters are both signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with right signs
and R2 =0 .845.
For the reduced parameters, which are non linear combinations of the structural parameters, the t-
statistic is calculated using as variance an approximation based on Taylor’s expansion (see Cox and Hinkley






























where b β1 and b β2 are unbiased estimators of the reduced parameters β1 and β2.
16O b s e r v et h a tg i v e nt h en e tg r o w t ho ft h eb i o m a s s ,G(Xt), the stock-recruitment relation (gross growth biomass
function) is F(Xt)=G(Xt)+Xt.
19Figure 1: Productivity shocks


















20Figure 2: Biomass Stock





































21Figure 3: CFP vs data:(a) Optimal Stock; (b) Catches








































































22Figure 4: Optimal TAC’s. (a) Total; (b) Spain; (c) France; (d) Rest of Union.






































































































































23Figure 5: Syde-Payments vs CFP:(a) Optimal Stock; (b) annual increase in proﬁts














































24Table 1: Eﬀort and shares for trawl ﬂeetsa)
Spain France
Year Eﬀortb) Share Eﬀortb) Share
1988 50.41 13.47 194.18 25.97
1989 43.75 11.40 152.12 29.79
1990 47.43 10.85 171.50 30.82
Average 47.20 11.93 172.60 28.82
a) D r a w nu pf r o md a t ai nT a b l e7 in Appendix A.2
b) Ships of 100 HP ﬁshing 365 days
25Table 2: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Data
A 12.851905 Northern Stock of Hake, 1978-2001.
α 0.8095038 Northern Stock of Hake, 1978-2001.
ρ -0.11741 Northern Stock of Hake, 1978-2001.
φ 0.91950 c.p.u.e. of Spanish (La Coruña) and French (RESSGASC) Trawls.
z and π see text Total catches in the Northern Stock of Hake, 1978-2001.
θfr 0.49000 French eﬀort in areas VII and VIII, 1988-1990.
λ 0.00618 French catches in areas VII and VIII, 1988-1990.
β 0.95000 interest rate 5%.
Parameter Targets
γfr 1.2344 French TAC, sfr =0 .30100.
γsp -0.1266 Spanish TAC, ssp =0 .51920.
γru -0.1078 Other Countries TACs, sru =1− sfr − ssp.
ω 439.8682 Fischler proposal criteria, X = 450,000.
26Table 3: Observed and Optimal C.F.P
Data Optimal C.F.P.
P2001




27Table 4: Optimal shares with side payments(γi =1 /3)
shares
s∗
fr 0.2853 θfr =0 .4900
s∗
sp 0.4294 θsp =0 .5329
s∗
ru 0.2853 θru =0 .4900



















t=1987 βt−16Πt 111,698 140,276
29Table 6: Stock and Catches Data (Tonnes). 1978-2001
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Stock 277,849 301,131 289,775 297,869 274,870 251,573 241,759 289,182
Catches 52,908 53,799 60,459 56,264 58,057 60,128 65,149 59,939
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Stock 268,652 252,517 222,101 226,086 193,996 196,294 174,406 176,920
Catches 60,053 65,320 66,818 68,781 61,410 59,286 58,290 53,637
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Stock 172,519 190,523 172,909 189,652 195,118 177,133 162,990 171.353
Catches 53,140 58,862 48,759 44,357 35,877 40,648 42,624 37,192
Source: Report ICES CM 2003/ACFM:01. From Table 16, page 78.
30Table 7: Data from trawler ﬂeets
Spain France
Year c.p.u.ea) Capturesb) c.p.u.e.c) Capturesd)
1988 178.49 8998 89.35 17350
1989 179.22 7841 128.77 20490
1990 140.53 6665 110.38 18929
a) Coruña trawler ﬂeet. Tn./year. Data from Table 3.2a in the WGHMM ICES Report CM
2003/ACFM:01. b) Spanish trawler ﬂeet ﬁshing in area VII. Tn. Data from Instituto Oceanogá-
ﬁco de Vigo. c) FR-RESSGASC trawler ﬂeet. Tn./year. Data from Table 3.2c in the WGHMM
ICES Report CM 2003/ACFM:01. d) French trawler ﬂeet ﬁs h i n gi na r e aV I I I .T n .D a t af r o m
Instituto Oceanogáﬁco de Vigo.
31Table 8: Data from all French ﬂeets ﬁs h i n gi nV I Ia n dV I I I
Year Capturesa) Shareb) Eﬀortc)
1988 21895 0.327 233.45
1989 24218 0.352 257.87
1990 21472 0.349 264.84
Source: Instituto Oceanográﬁco de Vigo
a) Tonnes; b) % of total stock; c) Ships ﬁshing 365 days
32Table 9: Estimations for Dynamic Resource Equation
Estimation t-statistics R2 F-statistics
Cushing Funtion F(Xt)=AXα
t
MSY=51,444 XMSY= 218,610 MCC=662,932
A 12.851905 2.737856* 0.845 114.128
α 0.80950384 10.683081*
Ricker Function F(Xt)=Xter(1−Xt/K)
MSY=52,543 XMSY= 335,353 MCC=475,145








MSY=53,478 XMSY= 226,656 MCC=453,312
r 0.47188926 4.846857* 0.225 6.082*
K 453312.68 2.8279229*









MSY=4.31E15 XMSY= 20142,185 MCC=30213,277
r -0.47369208 0.663937 0.225 2.896
K 0213,277 0.002571
K0 -0.014829952 -0.002585






MSY=52,356 XMSY= 221,565 MCC=602,277
r 0.23630267 2.471978* 0.225 6.111*
K 602277.14 0.19254299
∗ Signiﬁcant statistics at the 5% level
33